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A. Introduction
The interest theory and the will theory of rights inform debate as to the moral rights of children. Adolescents, who seek to have their choices respected to the extent that they impose obligations on others to treat or to withhold treatment or disclosure of information, may rely, as younger children may not, on the will theory. The interest theory too may be called upon to protect their moral rights, provided it can be shown that having the right will make them better-off. Translating moral rights into law, international guidance suggests a minimal level of protection. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, which is ratified by the UK (though it has no legal force) requires that: 'Article 12: States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the view of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.' Signatories to the Council of Europe's European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1 must abide by article 6, which leaves each country to define when a minor is viewed as competent to give a valid consent, but insists that for those viewed in law as not capable of providing consent, the treatment must directly benefit the minor; the authorisation of a legal representative is obtained and; 'the opinion of the minor shall be taken into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in proportion to his or her age and degree of Does the ban on parents vetoing their child's consent extend to their being unable to provide a valid consent to medical treatment the minor refuses? Subsequent cases drew a distinction between competent children's rights to consent and their right to withhold it, but, as we shall see, these cases resulted in extensive academic criticism.
Taylor has suggested that, post-Axon, the refusal cases which retreat from the autonomy principle laid down in Gillick might be challenged. 17 If the step is taken to deny parents a right to consent to treatment their competent child has refused, will 14 Gillick , ibid., 186. 15 [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin). 16 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, at 24, per Lord Steyn, 'I have come to the conclusion that, as a result of the surgeon's failure to warn the patient, [Miss Chester] cannot be said to have given informed consent to the surgery in the full legal sense. Her right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles.' 17 Taylor, R., "Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R (Axon) parents also lose the right to information about the minor's treatment? The Gillick competence test is decision-specific and the threshold for competence to consent to or refuse treatment may be set higher than the threshold for competence to consent to or refuse disclosure to a parent. Will parents retain a right to information even if they lose the right to consent to treatment their child has refused? A related issue concerns the application of the best interests test. In Gillick it was a condition that the treatment consented to by the minor was in her best interests. If Gillick is applied to refusals, at what level will the best interest test apply? Will health care professionals be called upon to decide whether the treatment or refusal is in the best interests of the child? Or will this assessment be left to the competent minor? Will the courts retain a power to overrule decisions in the best interest of the minor under its parens patriae jurisdiction?
Third, the test for competence is unclear. Whilst Lord Fraser set out a list of conditions specific to sexual advice and treatment, 18 Lord Scarman required a full understanding of the treatment proposed -a high and flexible threshold. What is clear, is that there is a higher threshold for competence for minors under the age of 16, than for those of 16 and over which fall within the presumption of capacity in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 19 Post Axon, Rachael Taylor questions whether, in an era of greater respect for the autonomy of young persons, this aspect of Gillick might also be challenged.
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The following sections explore each of these three issues in turn.
18 Gillick , supra n. 11, 174: '(1) that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his advice; (2) that he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to inform the parents that she is seeking contraceptive advice; (3) that she is very likely to begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives contraceptive advice or treatment her physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer; (5) that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive advice, treatment or both without the parental consent. power of parens patriae under which decisions will be governed by the paramountcy principle whenever the child's upbringing is determined by the court.
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In Axon, Silber J. was primarily concerned with Ms. Axon's parental rights. Gillick are raised, adoption of this reasoning might adversely affect the parental right to information about their child and the ability of our legal system to effectively protect the welfare of minors. The next section considers the potential for Axon to be extended to apply to treatment refusals, and the likely consequences of doing so.
C. Should there be a distinction between consent and refusal?
i. The refusal cases
The Gillick decision was widely celebrated. Lord Scarman's dicta implied that the ratio would apply to all treatment decisions rather than just contraceptive decisions.
Some saw it as a transferral of rights from the parent to the competent child. The Trust dropped the case after Hannah was interviewed by a Child Protection Officer. Whilst there is no official transcript of that conversation, it must be assumed that the Child Protection Officer concluded that Hannah was competent and that accepting her refusal to consent was in Hannah's best interests. Hannah handled events with a maturity which at once impresses and dismays, given the tragic circumstances through which it was acquired.
The press hailed the decision a victory for adolescent rights, 57 but Hannah's parents supported her decision and forcing an unwanted transplant and subsequent medication on an unconsenting recipient would present serious challenges.
Consequently there is an argument here too that the minor's autonomy rights and welfare were aligned. Arguably this decision would have been upheld in a court of law, and the distinction between giving and withholding consent still kept in tact.
iii. A right to refuse?
We have seen that in Gillick, Lord Scarman spoke of parental rights yielding once the minor became Gillick competent and that in Re R, Lord Donaldson separated the right to consent from a wider right to determination. Parents lost the right to veto the child's valid consent once their child was Gillick competent, but they did not lose the right to consent where the child failed to provide consent. 62 We can tentatively conclude that the analysis of adolescent privacy and autonomy in Axon might in future lead the courts in England and Wales to a similar conclusion.
At this point, you will recall Silber J.'s contention that parental rights under There is much to recommend this argument. To take it further, one might contend that if minors who are not competent to make treatment decisions are owed a duty of confidentiality, their (express or implied) consent is required in order to make a disclosure. But how should one judge their ability to consent? For very young children, there may rarely be situations where disclosure to a parent may prove harmful, but in the vast majority of cases, consent to disclosure will be implied. Once the child can express an opinion, a decision must be made as to whether it is a competent opinion. Their ability to consent to disclosure might be judged according to the test for Gillick competence, but as the test is decision-specific, the threshold will be different for the decision to consent to treatment and the decision to consent to disclosure to parents. The threshold is likely to be substantially lower for disclosure decisions. Thus a child may fall below the threshold for competence to make a treatment decision, but be able to express a view about disclosure. Disclosure to parents would constitute a breach of confidentiality, though that breach would usually be acceptable under the public interest defence and Article 8(2). Imagine 12 year old James wants a life-saving blood transfusion but does not want his parents to know about it. James cannot provide a valid consent to treatment, but the court may do so whilst respecting his right to confidentiality by keeping the information from his parents. If doctors tell his parents, they breach James's confidentiality. Whether or not that breach is defensible is quite another matter.
A child indicating that he wishes medical information to be kept secret is withholding his express consent. In this case disclosure can only be made in the public interest and if justified under Article 8(2). Loughrey argues that:
Where a child, even one who is non-competent [to consent to medical treatment], wants his medical information to be withheld from his parents, and disclosure is neither necessary to obtain parental consent to treatment nor justifiable by reference to the child's best interests, there are strong grounds for allowing the child's right to privacy to outweigh a parentcentred right to disclosure.
If Silber J. is right in his contention that parental rights under Article 8 cease when the minor attains Gillick competence, then given that the test is decision-specific, parents will generally lose the right to disclosure far earlier than they will lose the right to veto their child's medical decision. Of course, the tort of breach of confidence is subject to defences and it will often be possible to demonstrate a public interest in disclosing the information to parents that is required by them to consent on behalf of their child where he is not competent to do so himself. Once the child is able to consent to treatment, parental rights to information about his decision, whether relating to sexual treatment or otherwise, are much harder to defend.
In conclusion, if the autonomy-based arguments are utilised to found a right for competent minors to refuse treatment and Silber J.'s contention that parental rights cease when the minor's decision is Gillick competent is accepted, then not only will parents lose the right to provide that consent but they may also lose the right to information about their child's treatment. Whilst disclosure may be justified in the public interest, that disclosure must satisfy Article 8(2) and if the consent of the parent is not required this may be difficult to demonstrate.
In Finland 83 the medical team will assess whether or not a minor has capacity to give an informed consent. If the minor is deemed competent then he has a right to insist that information is not disclosed to his parents. The legal representative has a right to information only in so far as it enables him to give an effective consent.
Other countries differ in their approach. In Axon, Silber J. considered the US perspective whereby states may impose parental consent or parental notification prior to an abortion. 84 He did not consider this approach relevant given, amongst other things, the differences between the Charter of Rights and the ECHR. Yet in Europe too, some countries insist on greater rights for parents. We have already seen that some countries insist on a status-based approach whereby treatment of a minor requires parental consent. We have also seen that some countries require dual consent.
In Denmark, 85 is not required to provide consent, the parent might justifiably be informed.
D. Is the test for competence satisfactory?
The third issue requiring clarification in Gillick is the test for competence. In England and Wales, the presumption of capacity encapsulated in section 1(2) of the Mental cases previously illustrated, has been so readily manipulated.
If minors are to mount a challenge to the test for Gillick competence, one ground might be the lack of guidance as to how far the supposedly 'functional' test is dependent upon outcome. Clearer guidance would reduce instances in which the bar is set so high as to be unattainable or so low as to result in unnecessary and controversial use of the court's inherent jurisdiction to force treatment on the unconsenting child. It will come as no surprise that some minors will be better equipped to consent to a procedure in which an infected toe nail will be removed than they would to an emergency operation for an acute and life threatening illness. However, the decisionspecific test does not merely relate to the seriousness or complexity of the disease. It relates to the outcome or consequences of the decision. The more likely it is that the minor's decision operates against his best interests, the higher the threshold for competence. For example, it is unclear whether Hannah Jones's decision was respected because a) she was competent due to her life experience of hospitals and illness and / or b) she was competent because whilst the outcome of her refusal might result in her life ending, the consequences of forcing upon her both initial and long term non-consensual treatment would operate against her wider best interests. Had a heart transplant offered Hannah a better and more certain prognosis, not only might the courts have used their inherent jurisdiction or the Children Act 1989 to sanction the non-consensual treatment against her will, but, at a more basic level, the better prognosis might have been utilised to demonstrate that Hannah's decision was not competent because the consequences of the refusal would be deemed more serious and therefore the threshold for competence raised to an unattainable level.
Just as the vagueness of the test for capacity can lead to a high and unattainable threshold for capacity, Brazier and Bridge assert that it has occasionally led to an unduly low threshold. 96 If the threshold is set too low and a minor is held to be competent, this might lead to the courts controversially utilising their inherent jurisdiction or a section 8 order to overrule the minor's competent decision.
Harris lists four defects which may undermine autonomous choice and justify paternalistic decision-making. 97 Using this model, Brazier and Bridge suggest that:
'Misunderstandings of what constitutes maximally autonomous choice resulted in judges apparently overruling 'competent' choices which analysis shows to be in no real sense 'autonomous' choice.' 98 The outcome of the decisions is less controversial than the means by which the decisions were made. This is not to say that a firmer test for capacity would render the courts' inherent jurisdiction to order non-consensual medical treatment obsolete. information about the manner of her death. A presumption of capacity at a lower age would have given minors over the age limit a right to such information, though in these cases, it is possible that the presumption might have been rebutted on grounds other than their lack of information. Thus, one potential option by which the test for competence is made more meaningful would be to lower the age for a presumption of capacity. Any child falling below the age limit, however, would benefit from firmer guidance which supports a test for competence which, whilst sensitive to complexity, is not reliant on outcome. 99 Taylor, R., supra, n.17.
E. Conclusion
Recognition The first is the importance of accurately guiding the medical team in the advice they give to families. Even though there are likely to be few cases where parents will be able to assert their right to information against the wishes of their competent child, it is important that adolescents know when they can withhold information and parents know when they are entitled to it.
The second reason is the distinct nature of consent and confidentiality which should not always be conflated. Though both autonomy and privacy are protected by Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the defences to breach of confidentiality and treatment without consent are at common law quite distinct. Whilst competence to consent to treatment and disclosure of information were aligned in both Gillick and should be recognised to co-exist with those of the minor. Where the consequences of withholding information from parents might interfere with family life (for example, because the minor might die), their right to information may take precedence over the
